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RECENT DECISIONS
CIVIL PROCEDURE-CORPORATE AMENABILITY TO SERVICE OF
PROCEss-FEDERAL LAW APPLICABLE TO DETERMINE
CORPORATE PRESENCE.
Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., (2d Cir. 1960).
Plaintiffs, citizens of Maryland, alleging injury from pajamas that
"'went up in flames," instituted suit in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York against Jaftex, a New York
corporation. Jaftex sought to implead Randolph Mills, Inc. of North
Carolina, the ultimate manufacturer of the fabric. Service of process was
made in New York on an officer of Iselin-Jefferson Company, also named
as a third-party defendant, as selling agent for Randolph Mills. On
motion by Randolph Mills to vacate the service and dismiss the third-party
complaint, the district court held that the service, though valid under
federal law, was invalid under state law and that state law was con-
trolling. The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, reversed
and remanded holding that service of process was valid under both New
York and federal law and that federal law is to be applied in determining
whether a foreign corporation is present within a district so as to make it
amendable to service of process.' Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc.,
282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960).
Federal courts as,':dicating state created rights only because of the
diversity of citizenship of the litigants must apply state law,2 if disre-
gard of state law would "significantly affect the result" of the litigation.3
The avowed purpose of this rule is to insure that the result reached by a
federal court will not be substantially different from the result which
would have been achieved by a state court.4 Applying the test of uni-
formity of outcome literally, a federal court could not assert jurisdiction
over a particular defendant and adjudicate a controversy if the state courts
would not exercise jurisdiction. With the exception of the case of Byrd
1. Friendly, J. concurred in the result but disagreed with the latter, alternative
holding.
2. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
4. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, supra note 3.
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RECENT DECISIONS
v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop.,5 uniformity of outcome seems to have been
the sole consideration of the Supreme Court in determining whether state
or federal law is to be applied.6 In the Byrd case the Court held that the
doctrine of uniformity of outcome was not controlling where the state
procedural law was not an integral part of the state created right and
there was a strong federal policy opposed to the state law.7 That juris-
diction over the subject matter is determinable by federal law cannot be
doubted,8 and although no such unequivocal assertion is possible regarding
jurisdiction over the person, it has been argued persuasively that such
jurisdiction is within a "twilight zone"9 between substance and procedure
where Congress may provide a uniform rule of procedure for the federal
courts.' 0 In the absence of legislation" the court in the principal case
purports to find a strong federal policy in prior judicial decisions deter-
mining corporate amenability to service of process through a federal
"doing business" test.12 Although the Supreme Court has not decided
whether state or federal law is to determine amenability to service of
5. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
6. E.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc., 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (state
law invalidating contract provisions to submit to arbitration must be applied in
federal district court) ; Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S.
530 (1949) (state law to determine when statute of limitations is tolled by instituting
suit) ; Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949) and Angel v. Bullington,
330 U.S. 183 (1947) (state statute barring plaintiff from bringing action in the
state court must be applied in federal district court). Cf. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,
312 U.S. 1 (1940) (upholding rule 35 FMD. R. Civ. P. requiring a party to submit
to a physical examination).
7. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Corp, 356 U.S. 525, 535 (1958). The
strong federal policy in this case was the assignment of disputed questions of fact
to the jury, as the Court said, "... under the influence - if not the command - of
the Seventh Amendment ... "
8. U.S. Const. art III, § 2, "The Judicial Power shall extend to ... controversies
... between Citizens of different States . .."
9. Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 756-57 (1st Cir. 1940), cert. denied 310
U.S. 650 (1940).
10. Iovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied; Carlin
v. Iovino, 362 U.S. 949 (1960). See also, Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282
F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960) (concurring opinion), 67 YALE L.J. 1094 (1958).
11. Congress has supplied a standard of doing business in regard to venue. 28
U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1948). It is arguable that since the provisions regarding venue and
jurisdiction were previously grouped together, 28 U.S.C. § 112 (1940), the doing
business test of § 1391 (c) is also applicable to jurisdiction over the person. How-
ever § 1391 (c) refers explicitly to venue and since its purpose was probably to
overcome the "waiver" theory in Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308
U.S. 165 (1939), the validity of such argument is doubtful. See 67 YALE L.J. 1094,
1099 n.18 (1958) (suggesting possible adverse effects of equating the two provisions).
Although it might be construed that the absence of any mention of state law in
rule 4(d) (3) FED. R. Civ. P. while specifically included in rule 4(d) (7) implies
the use of federal law under rule 4(d) (3), though both relate only to manner of
service of process, rule 82 FED. R. Civ. P. states that the rules ". . . shall not
be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district
courts ....... Query whether the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are Acts of
Congress. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 18 (1940) (dissenting opinion).
12. Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508, 512-13 (2d Cir. 1960).
But see dissenting opinion arguing against not only the strength of a federal policy
in this area but also against its existence. Id. 520-21.
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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
process in diversity cases,'18 it is apparent that the choice of law governing
jurisdiction over the person is not immune from the uniformity of outcome
doctrine when a state closes the doors of its courts to a litigant. 14 At
least where such a door closing statute is an expression of a clear and
precise substantive state policy federal courts must also decline to hear the
case.15 It appears that when a state declines to exercise jurisdiction, but
does so not because of a substantive state policy, such ruling would not be
binding on the federal courts if the state law were in opposition to a
strong federal policy. 18 However, although a state may exercise juris-
diction over a foreign corporation if such exercise does not offend due
process 17 it need not exercise the full extent of jurisdiction constitutionally
allowable."' Since the federal test of presence by doing business appears
to be the allowable extreme short of violating due process requirements, 19
application of federal law when a state does not exercise its full power
could conceivably violate a state policy to restrict jurisdiction or impose
on a state a policy not contemplated. 20 It is therefore impossible to make
an abstract assertion that jurisdiction over the person is divorced from state
created rights. Courts adhering to the literal outcome determinative test limit
the scope of federal law in determining corporate presence to a determination
of whether exercise of jurisdiction consistant with state law would violate due
13. But see K. Shapiro, Inc. v. New York Cent. R.R., 152 F. Supp. 722 (E.D.
Mich. 1957) which used federal law relying on Riverbank Laboratories v. Hardwood
Products Corp., 350 U.S. 1003 reversing the circuit court, 220 F.2d 465 (7th Cir.
1955), the circuit court having applied state law.
The court in the principal case also relies on Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170
U.S. 100 (1898) (plaintiff sued a British corporation) which held that a suit could
be maintained in a federal court although service on the defendant was not valid
under New York law, stating that state law cannot impair jurisdiction granted to
the federal courts. This statement appears to be in regard to jurisdiction over the
subject matter and valid. Kenny v. Alaska Airlines, 132 F. Supp. 838, 843 (S.D.
Cal. 1955). If directed to jurisdiction over the person it appears to have been
modified by Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947) and Woods v. Interstate
Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949) although neither case expressly overrules the
Barrow case. At any rate it is a pre-Erie case and it would be begging the question
to decide the impact of Erie on the law by answering with a case deciding the
law prior to the Erie case. It is also questionable whether the rationale of Erie and
subsequent cases applies to suits between a citizen of the United States and a foreign
citizen or is limited to suits between citizens of different states. The underlying
policy of the doctrine of uniformity of outcome is that a non-resident should not be
afforded a choice of law when a resident is not. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326
U.S. 99, 109 (1945). Since the federal courts are open to all citizens suing citizens
of foreign states the policy reason for the doctrine is not applicable.
14. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949); Angel v. Bullington,
330 U.S. 183 (1947).
15. Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508, 514 (2d Cir. 1960).
16. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
17. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
18. Perkins v. Benquet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
19. The more recent cases deciding the quantity of business necessary to subject
a corporation to suit have been cases' involving due process limitations of the
exercise of state judicial power. E.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) ; McGee
v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
20. Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508, 522 (2d Cir. 1960)
(concurring opinion).
[VOL. 6
3
Editors: Recent Decisions
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1961
RECENT DECISIONS
process requirements.2 1 The present court would probably apply state
law where a case is removed to the federal court from a state court,22
and where service of process is made under a state statute ;23 therefore
the area of conflict appears to be limited to whether state or federal law
is applicable under rule 4(d) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 4
The purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to insure non-resident liti-
gants a trial free from local prejudice25 and the underlying policy of the
Erie case is to avoid discrimination against local residents by refusing
to allow non-residents a choice of law when a resident may use only
state law.26 Identity of outcome between state and federal courts is the
rule devised to implement this policy and not an end in itself. The
purpose of the doctrine is to implement this underlying policy and not to
destroy uniformity of procedure in the federal courts. When this policy
conflicts with another federal policy it would seem strict application of an
outcome determinative test to state procedural law is to harden the
doctrine into a rule without reason. When policy reasons conflict the
stronger should prevail. The Byrd case recognizes this but the federal
policy deemed controlling there was almost a constitutional command.27
Furthermore the state procedural law disregarded was interpreted as a
practice developed without reason and not an integral part of the state
created right. Thus the federal policy war as strong as possible without
being a clear constitutional directive or statute and the state procedural
law almost totally severed from the state created right. Whether the doc-
trine of identity of outcome should control if a lesser degree of either
requisite is present is debatable. In the principal case there is no applicable
constitutional provision nor a discernable legislative provision When
Congress has legislated uniformity of procedure within the "twilight
zone" where it may constitutionally act 28 it is a clear manifestation of
federal policy, and were there a specific statute directed to jurisdiction
over corporations authorizing a standard of doing business in the district
to determine amenability to service of process, there is no doubt but
21. E.g., Partin v. Michaels Art. Bronze Co., 202 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1953) ; Pulson
v. American Rolling Mills Co., 170 F.2d 193 (Ist Cir. 1948).
22. Bomze v. Nordis Sportswear, Inc., 165 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1948). Contra,
2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 4.25, 970 (2d ed. 1948).
23. The court cites with approval Nash-Ringel v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc.,
172 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) holding federal law applicable while distinguishing
cases applying state law where service is made pursuant to a state statute. Contra,
2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 4.25, 970 (2d ed. 1948).
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) ". . . Service shall be made as follows: . . . (3)
Upon a domestic or foreign corporation .. .by delivering a copy of the summons
and complaint to an officer, a managing or general agent or to any other agent
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process . . .
25. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). But see Friendly, The
Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARv. L. REv. 483 (1928).
26. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, supra, note 25.
27. See note 7, supra.
28. Iovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, Carlin v.
Iovino, 362 U.S. 949 (1960) ; Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 756-57 (1st Cir.
1940), cert denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940).
SPRING 1961]
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that it should prevail over a contrary state law. In the absence of such
clear legislative direction, a procedural policy developed pursuant to a
constitutional inference, also within the "twilight zone," is strong enough
if the state procedural law is not an integral part of the state created right.2 9
Where no strong federal policy exists in opposition to the Erie doctrine,
outcome determination should be the only consideration whether or not
the state procedural law is an integral part of the state created right.30
It is submitted that strained statutory construction3' and pre-Erie judicial
decisions 32 relied on in the instant case present no such strong federal
policy as will obviate the Erie doctrine. To expand the concept of policy
enunciated in the Byrd case as advocated by the court would seem to lead
to the entanglements the Supreme Court sought to avoid when it said:
"A policy [the Erie doctrine] so important to our federalism must be
kept free from entanglements with analytical or terminological niceties." 33
Edward C. McCardle
CONFLICT OF LAWS-INSURANCE CONTRACT-EFFECT OF
ENDORSEMENT ON CHOICE OF LAW.
Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Aresty (N.Y. 1960).
Pursuant to a New York statute' providing that no insurance policy
covers any liability of the insured due to injury to his or her spouse un-
less such coverage is specifically included in the policy, plaintiff insurer
sought a declaratory judgment that defendant's automobile liability policy,
which contained no such provision, did not cover injuries sustained by
his wife in a collision while defendant was driving in Connecticut. 2 De-
fendant had lived in New York, and the policy had been originally issued
and delivered in that state. Subsequently he had moved to Connecticut,
so a change of address had been endorsed on the policy3 and a portion of
29. See note 7, supra. See also 72 HARV. L. Rtv. 147-50 (1958) (suggesting
this "policy" would prevail even if the state procedural law were an integral part of
the state created right).
30. Klaxton v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1940) (requiring federal
district court to apply conflict of laws rule of the state in which it sits and state
had no contact with facts creating the controversy). But see Hill, The Erie
Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 427 (1958).
31. See note 11, supra.
32. See note 13, supra.
33. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945).
1. N.Y. INSURANCt LAW § 167(3).
2. Connecticut had no comparable statute.
3. The endorsement was made in New York; this would be one factor in favor
of adopting New York law under the "grouping of contracts" theory explained later.
[VOL. 6
5
Editors: Recent Decisions
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1961
RECENT DECISIONS
the premium refunded due to the lower risk incidence there. Six months
later, after the accident had occurred, defendant's wife sued him in a
still pending Connecticut action for personal injury damages. Plaintiff
then brought the declaratory judgment action in which defendant con-
tended that the refund and endorsement rewrote the contract of insurance
so as to make Connecticut law applicable in determining his liability to his
spouse. The New York Supreme Court denied plaintiff's motion for sum-
mary judgment, but the Appellate Division, in a three to two decision,
reversed the lower court order and granted the motion, holding that the
endorsement and refund did not constitute the making of a new contract
subject to Connecticut law; thus the New York statute still applied and
plaintiff was not subject to liability.4 Employers' 'Liability Assurance
Corp. v. Aresty, 11 App. Div. 2d 331, 205 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1960).
The many different rules laid down in various jurisdictions, and often
within the same jurisdiction, for determining the law applicable to
insurance contracts has led one court to remark that "decisions involving
the application of the insurance laws of several states to transactions in-
cluding foreign elements appear irreconcilable in terms of any uniform
conflict of laws theories." The specific problem in the instant case is to
decide what law should be applied in determining plaintiff's liability for
a Connecticut accident under a policy issued in New York to a New
Yorker who has since moved his domicile to Connecticut and uses and
garages his car there. The traditional rule is that the execution, interpre-
tation and validity of a contract are determined by the law of the state
where the contract is made,6 and its performance by the law of the state
where it is to be performed.7 Other courts have adopted a different rule,
or what is sometimes called an exception to the former one, in which the
law applicable is determined by the intent of the parties at the time of the
making of the contract.8 A third rule which was adopted by the New York
Court of Appeals in 19549 is based on the "center of gravity" or "grouping
of contracts" theory, whereby the law of the place that has the most
significant contacts with the matter in dispute has been held to be con-
trolling.10 Often all the 'rules give the same result due to the fact that the
state where the policy is issued and the state of the insured's domicile
4. A secondary basis for not holding the insurer liable was that such would
be unfair to him in that the defendant had not paid for coverage of the risk involved
in the instant case. See text at footnote 20, infra.
5. Zogg v. Pennsylvania Mutual Life Ins. Co., 276 F.2d 861, 864 (2d Cir. 1960).
6. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 293 U.S. 335 (1934); Swift & Co. v.
Banker's Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 135, 19 N.E.2d 992 (1939); Union National Bank v.
Chapman, 169 N.Y. 538, 62 N.E. 672 (1902).
7. Longdon Assurance Co. v. Companhia .de Moagens, 167 U.S. 169 (1896);
Goodwin v. Provident Savings Life Assurance Ass'n, 97Iowa 226, 66 N.W. 157(1896); Union National Bank v. Chapman, 169 N.Y. 538, 62 N.E. 672 (1902).
8. Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Ass'n v. Baldridge, 70 F.2d 236 (10th
Cir. 1934).
9. Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
10. Barber v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417 (1945); Rubin v. Irving
Trust, 305 N.Y. 288, 113 N.E.2d 424 (1953).
SPRING 1961] 409
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are one and the same; in such a case the law of that state naturally ap-
plies. This has been held to be true even if the accident involved in the
suit occurred outside that state." The problem is made more complex
however, when an endorsement is made on an existing contract of insur-
ance, especially when the endorsement recognizes that the insured now has
a foreign domicile. The general rule in construing endorsements is that
both the endorsement and the policy must be read together, and the policy
remains in full force except as altered by the words of endorsement.
12
Endorsements are not usually considered to be or to create new contracts, 13
and hence are subject to the same law as the original policy. The instant
case held this to be so and New York law to be applicable even though
the endorsement signified a change of the insured's domicile and of the
place of primary use and garage of the insured car.
The majority opinion applied the rule that the law of the place
where the contract is made governs the insurer's liability, citing the 1939
case of Swift & Co. v. Banker's Trust Co.14  In 1954, however, the
New York Court of Appeals adopted in Auten v. Auten"5 the "grouping
of contracts" theory for conflicts problems, and that rule has been followed
in later New York cases.' 6 Admittedly the 1957 New Amsterdam Casualty
Co. v. Stecker case 17 went back to the old rule of Swift but then inex-
plicably it favorably cited Auten in support of its reasoning. In any event,
Auten has never been overturned and it would seem should have been
followed here.' 8 Applying the grouping of contacts rule, it appears that
Connecticut has more significant contacts involved than does New York.' 9
Alternatively it would be more reasonable for the court to apply the intent
11. Hinchey v. National Surety Co., 99 N.H. 373, 111 A.2d 827 (1955); New
Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Stecker, 3 N.Y. 2d 1, 143 N.E.2d 357 (1957).
12. Birnbaum v. Jamestown Mutual Ins. Co., 298 N.Y. 305, 83 N.E.2d 128
(1948); Thompson-Starrett Co. v. American Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 276 N.Y.
266, 11 N.E.2d 905 (1937).
13. Narver v. California State Life Ins. Co., 211 Cal. 176, 294 Pac. 393 (1930)
Birnbaum v. Jamestown Mutual Ins. Co., 298 N.Y. 305, 83 N.E.2d 128 (1948).
But cf. Northrup v. Mississippi Valley Ins. Co., 47 Mo. 435 (1871).
14. 280 N.Y. 135, 19 N.E.2d 992 (1939).
15. 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
16. Globel Commerce Corp. v. Clark-Babbitt Industries Inc., 239 F.2d 716
(2d Cir. 1956) ; Randy Knitwear Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 7 App. Div. 2d 116,
180 N.Y.S.2d 471 (1958); Von Tresckow v. Von Tresckow, 181 N.Y.S.2d 406
(Sup. Ct. 1958); Anderson v. Anderson, 147 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
17. 3 N.Y.2d 1, 143 N.E.2d 357 (1957).
18. The majority did note the Auten case but then made the perplexing assumption
that the decision there was really based on the intent of the parties and the place of
performance. It is perplexing in light of'the following language taken from the
Auten case: "Turning to the case before us, examination of the respective contacts
with New York and England compels the conclusion that it is English law which
must be applied." (124 N.E.2d at 102) ; "[E]ven if we were not to place our
emphasis on the law of the place with the most significant contacts .... ".(124
N.E.2d at 103).
19. Among the Connecticut contacts are: the insured is domiciled there, the
car is used principally and garaged there, the accident occurred there, and the marital
relations between two of her citizens are involved. Among the New York contacts
are: the policy was issued and endorsed there, the insurer's main office is there and
the insured was a resident there.
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theory than the traditional rule which, according to the majority opinion,
requires a new contract before the applicable law can be changed. Under
the circumstances of the principal case, it can be inferred that the parties
intended Connecticut law to apply at the time they made the endorsement.
Even if no new contract was created in law, it would appear not to be
unreasonable to give effect to the intention of the parties as exhibited by
their endorsement. Furthermore, in answer to the majority's secondary
point that the rate charged was not commensurate with the risk sought
to be imposed since the insurer did not include possible spouse liability
in computing the adjusted premium, two solutions are possible; either the
insurer could be forced to bear the loss due to his own inadvertence or,
preferably, the defendant's recovery from the insurer could be reduced by
the added premium he should have paid. While that might seem to be
giving the insured an overly advantageous interpretation of the contract,20
it must be remembered that an insurance contract is a contract of adhesion
and is to be construed most strongly against the insurer.2 1
Frederick M. Lavin
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT-STATE
STATUTE ALTERING MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES WITH EFFECT OF
EXCLUDING NEGRO VOTERS HELD INVALID.
Gomillion v. Lightfoot (U.S. 1960).
The Alabama legislature in 1957 enacted Local Act No. 140 re-
defining the boundaries of the City of Tuskegee in Macon County, Alabama.
The Act altered the shape of the city from a square to an irregular twenty-
eight sided figure, with the result that all but four or five of Tuskegee's
four hundred qualified Negro voters were excluded from the city, while
no white .residents were so excluded. Petitioners, Negro residents of
Tuskegee prior to the redistricting, brought an action in the United States
District Court for a declaratory judgment that Local Act No. 140 deprived
them and other Negroes similarly situated of due process of law and
equal protection of the laws in violation of the fourteenth amendment,
and of their right to vote in Tuskegee elections in violation of the
fifteenth amendment. The complaint also sought to enjoin respondents,
20. Insured would not have to pay for coverage against a potential suit by his
wife until one occurred; by paying for it at that time he would be covered.
21. Aschenbrenner v. United States Fidelity and Guarantee Co., 292 U.S. 80
(1934); Stipich v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 277 U.S. 311 (1928); Sutton v.
Hawkeye Casualty Co., 138 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1943).
SPRING 1961]
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1961], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol6/iss3/5
412 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 6
officials of the City of Tuskegee and of Macon County, from enforcing
the redistricting Act. The district court dismissed the action for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted and for lack of jurisdiction.'
The court of appeals affirmed, with one judge dissenting.2 On certiorari,
the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that a state statute
altering the boundaries of a political subdivision of the state is invalid
under the fifteenth amendment when its purpose and effect is to dis-
enfranchise citizens because of their race. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 81 Sup.
Ct. 125 (1960).
The power of the states to establish, alter, and abolish their internal
political subdivisions has frequently been stated in the broadest terms.
In the words of one commentator, this power is "plenary, inherent, and
discretionary in the legislature, and, when duly exercised, cannot be
revised by the courts." 3 Similar language is to be found in numerous
decisions of the Supreme Court.4 It is well settled that the legislative
creation of a municipal corporation does not give rise to a contractual
relationship between the state and such corporation, nor does it limit the
power of the state to alter the powers, diminish the territory, or terminate
the existence of the municipality. 5 This conclusion follows necessarily from
the concept of municipalities as "a part of the machinery of the state,"6
deriving all of their political powers from the state, and liable to have those
powers "enlarged, modified, or diminished at any time, without their
consent, or even without notice."'7 Both the district court and the court
of appeals in the instant case relied upon the often cited case of Hunter
v. City of Pittsburgh, which upheld the validity of a Pennsylvania statute
consolidating the City of Allegheny with the City of Pittsburgh over the
objection of a majority of Allegheny voters.8 In that case, the Supreme
Court held that the citizens of a municipal corporation have no vested
right, by contract or otherwise, in the continued existence of the corpo-
ration, and that the state may abolish or consolidate such a corporation
even though economic hardship to its citizens results. The underlying
theory of this conception of state power is that a state in regulating its
internal subdivisions is performing a political function within the area
1. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 167 F. Supp. 405 (M.D. Ala. 1958).
2. 270 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1959).
3. COOLEY, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 106 (1914).
4. City of Trenton v. State of New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192 (1923); City of
Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil & Gas Co., 250 U.S. 394 (1919); Hunter v. City of
Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907); Laramie County Comm'rs v. Albany County
Comm'rs, 92 U.S. 307 (1876).
5. Laramie County Comm'rs v. Albany County Comm'rs, 92 U.S. 307 (1876).
6. Id. at 311.
7. Id. at 312.
8. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907). Appellants contended that
enforced consolidation impaired a contractual right of Allegheny residents to have
their municipal taxes expended only for the benefit of their own municipality, and
deprived them of property without due process of law by subjecting them to the
burden of additional taxation resulting from consolidation. The Court rejected the
existence of such rights.
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reserved to it by the tenth amendment. Stressing the political nature of
the Alabama statute, respondents relied upon Colegrove v. Green.9 In
that case, the Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of an action for a de-
claratory judgment of the invalidity of an Illinois apportionment statute
establishing congressional districts grossly unequal in population; the
ground of the dismissal was that the question raised was "of a peculiarly
political nature and therefore not meet for judicial determination."' 0
Respondents in the instant case urged that Alabama's action was equally
political in nature and hence within the scope of the Colegrove holding.
From the foregoing, it will be seen that the instant case is of major
constitutional significance in the limitation which it places upon the control
of the states over their political subdivisions. Reduced to its essentials,
it holds that this control may not be exercised in such a manner as to
deprive citizens of personal rights secured by the federal constitution.
This is hardly a novel proposition; it is rather the application of a well-
established principle to a new factual situation. It does not clash with
the rule of the Hunter case, for that decision, when divorced from its rather
extravagant and generalized dicta, held only that residents of a municipality
have no vested contractual or property interest in the continuation of
such residence. It clearly does not follow from this that they may be
deprived of the benefits of such residence, including municipal suffrage,
only because of their race." The instant decision is strongly supported
by a number of cases which have held that the state's power to alter
and abolish its subdivisions is limited by the constitutional provision pro-
hibiting the impairment of contracts and may not be used in such a way
as to leave the creditors of such subdivisions without effective recourse
for their debts. 12 In this connection, the state's power to destroy its
municipal corporations has been equated with its power to repeal its
legislation, another "political" power which is certainly not absolute. 13
It would seem that, if the state's power in this field is restricted by the
contracts clause, it must necessarily be equally restricted by the rights
secured by the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments.14
9. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
10. Id. at 552.
11. Respondents contended that, since the legislature unquestionably had power
to enact the complained of statute, the courts ought not to concern themselves with
its motive in doing so. This contention, not discussed by the Supreme Court, was
aptly answered in Judge Brown's dissenting opinion in the court of appeals, 270
F.2d 594, 599. While the courts should not inquire into the motives of individual
legislators, judicial review would be a dull blade indeed if it could not probe beyond
the innocent face of a statute to discover the discriminatory intent of the legislature
itself, as manifested by the inevitable effects of its act. It is the effect which is
decisive. See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922), among many others.
12. Graham v. Folsom, 200 U.S. 248 (1906) ; Shapleigh v. City of San Angelo,
167 U.S. 646 (1897) ; Port of Mobile v. United States ex rel. Watson, 116 U.S. 289
(1886); Town of Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514 (1880).
13. Graham v. Folsom, 200 U.S. 248, 253 (1906).
14. The apportionment of school districts is a political function, but clearly the
state could not rearrange such districts in such a way as to segregate pupils along
racial lines. See Cooper v. Aaron, 359 U.S. 1 (1958).
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The instant case may be said to reject the proposition that a state's
acts may be insulated from constitutional challenge merely by characterizing
them as "political." In this connection, respondents' position, particularly
in its reliance upon Colegrove v. Green, would appear to be premised on
the fallacious assumption that a state's political act must necessarily give
rise to a political question. The "political question doctrine," as developed
by the courts, is a particularly ill-defined one.15 In general, however, a
political question is one which the courts will decline to decide, either
because its decision has been constitutionally entrusted to the political
departments of the government 16 or because "satisfactory criteria for a
judicial determination"' 7 are lacking. On this basis, and apart from ob-
vious factual differences,' 8 the Colegrove case and the instant case are dis-
tinguishable. Colegrove was concerned with the apportionment of con-
gressional districts. Control over the time, place, and manner of electing
representatives is specifically entrusted to Congress,', and each house of
Congress is the sole judge of its members' qualifications. 20 Further, the
granting of the relief sought in Colegrove would have compelled the
federal courts in effect to assume responsibility for the total reconstruction
of a state's electoral system, a peculiarly non-judicial task. Finally, the
wrong complained of in Colegrove was essentially one "to Illinois as a
polity,"' 2' for which the Illinois electorate could find a political remedy at
the polls; it was not directed at a particular minority group. It seems
quite clear that it was these considerations, which were not present in the
instant case, which placed the Colegrove case in the political question
category. The instant case would appear to be more analogous in princi-
ple to Nixon v. Herndon,22 which invalidated a Texas statute denying
Negroes the right to vote in primary elections. Mr. Justice Holmes,
speaking for a unanimous court, conceded that Texas's act was political
and added: "That private damage may be caused by such' political action,
and may be recovered for in a suit at law, hardly has been doubted for over
two hundred years .... ,,23 This being so, there appears to be no rational
basis for distinguishing between an action for damages, as in the Herndon
15. See generally Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARV. L. Rev. 338
(1924).; Weston, Political Questions, 38 HARV. L. Rv. 296 (1925). For examples of
political questions see Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (ratification of con-
stitutional amendments); Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51 (1923)
(termination of state of war); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (re-
publican form of government); United States v. Trumbull, 48 Fed. 99 (S.D. Cal.
1891) (existence of de facto government).
16. Weston, Political Questions, 38 HARV. L. Rev. 296, 301 (1925).
17. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454 (1939).
18. Appellants in Colegrove did not complain of any specific legislative action
but rather of the legislature's failure to reapportion congressional districts in re-
sponse to population changes; there was no complaint of discrimination against a
racial minority and hence no fifteenth amendment problem.
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
20. U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 5.
21. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946).
22. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
23. Id. at 540.
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case, and an action for equitable relief as in the instant case. It would be
difficult indeed, in the light of the Herndon holding and others,24 to accept
the proposition that a state in the discharge of its political functions is
not subject to the specific limitations of the federal constitution. If
this is so, the instant case must be regarded as an application of the general
principle that ". . . a' constitutional power cannot be used by way of
condition to attain an unconstitutional result. '25
It would appear that the principal problem raised by the instant case is
the extent to which it marks an alteration in the political question doctrine as
previously understood. If the above analysis is correct, it will be seen that
the Court's holding is not a departure from that doctrine or a step toward
the overruling of Colegrove v. Green, the most important recent exposi-
tion of the doctrine.26 It is rather a reaffirmation of the principle that
political acts may be judicially invalidated when they deprive citizens of
constitutionally guaranteed rights and when they do not fall within the
comparatively narrow class of political questions. This is equally true
whether the decision is based upon the fifteenth amendment or upon the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, as suggested in the
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Whittaker.27  Municipal suffrage is
conditional upon municipal residence; the exclusion of a racial minority
from residence, and hence from suffrage, would seem to be equally re-
pugnant to both amendments. The instant case must be regarded there-
fore as a step forward in the long-sustained judicial effort 28 to secure
to citizens belonging to racial minorities the rights guaranteed by these
amendments.
John J. Cannon
24. E.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 359 U.S. 1 (1958); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268
(1939); Nixon v. Condon, 268 U.S. 73 (1932); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S.
347 (1915) ; Graham v. Folsom, 200 U.S. 248 (1906).
25. Western Telegraph Co. v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105, 114 (1918).
26. It should be noted, however, that the Colegrove case was decided by a four
to three vote of a seven member court. Three justices based the decision on lack of
jurisdiction; Mr. Justice Rutledge concurred on the ground that the court had
jurisdiction but should not exercise it for equitable reasons. Justices Douglas and
Murphy concurred in Mr. Justice Black's dissent. Note also that the Supreme Court
has recently granted certiorari in the case of Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D.
Tenn. 1959), cert granted 29 U.S.L. WeiK 3152 (U.S. Nov. 21, 1960), a case
identical to Colegrove except that it involves state legislative districts. The careful
distinguishing of Colegrove in the instant decision, however, does not seem to be
indicative as an inclination to reject the rule of that case.
27. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 81 Sup. Ct. 125, 131 (1960). The concurring
opinion points out that the excluded Negroes still have the right to vote in the
divisions in which they are now resident. It would appear, however, that the dep-
rivation because of race of an existing right to vote in a particular municipality falls
within the ban of the fifteenth amendment, regardless of a compensating right to vote
elsewhere. To avoid any difficulty in this connection, Mr. Justice Whittaker would
base the court's decision on the equal protection clause and Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). This appears to be an equally adequate basis of
decision, and the total silence of the majority opinion on the equal protection aspect
of the case may be indicative of a desire to narrowly limit the application of its
holding.
28. The results of this effort are seen in cases starting with Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) and continuing through Cooper v. Aaron, 359 U.S. 1(1958).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION IN Bus TERMINAL RESTAURANT
VIOLATES INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT.
Boynton v. Virginia (U.S. 1960).
Petitioner, a Negro interstate passenger aboard a Trailways bus,
was refused service in the "white" section of the bus terminal restaurant
at Richmond, Virginia where the bus had made a forty minute rest
stop. The restaurant was operated by Bus Terminal Restaurant of
Richmond, Inc., as lessee of the Trailways Bus Terminal, Inc., owner of
the terminal building.' Upon petitioner's refusal to remove to the Negro
section he was arrested, tried and convicted on a charge of having re-
mained upon the premises of another without authority of law after having
been forbidden to do so. 2 On appeal to the Hustings Court of Richmond,
petitioner moved to dismiss on the grounds that this application of
Virginia law violated the Interstate Commerce Act and the equal pro-
tection, due process and commerce clauses of the federal constitution.
The motion was denied and the Virginia Supreme Court rejected peti-
tioner's assignments of error based on the constitutional violations, af-
firming the lower court. Petitioner did not specifically charge a violation of
the Interstate Commerce Act in the Virginia Supreme Court and did
not raise that question in the petition for certiorari which was granted by
the United States Supreme Court.8 Disregarding this omission and
reasoning that the underlying problem of discrimination because of color
was the core of both the constitutional and statutory questions, the Court
chose to avoid reaching those constitutional questions but rather attacked
the conviction on the basis of the Interstate Commerce Act. Mr. Justice
Black delivered the judgment of the majority that since "the circumstances
show that the terminal and restaurant operate as an integral part of
the bus carrier's transportation service for interstate passengers" the
restaurant was brought under the Interstate Commerce Act forbidding
discrimination of any kind. Therefore, petitioner was in the "white"
section of the restaurant "under authority of law" and the conviction under
1. The Trailways bus upon which petitioner was travelling was apparently owned
by the Virginia Stage Lines, Inc. The amicus curiae brief filed for the United
States included the annual reports of Virginia Stage Lines, Inc. and Carolina
Coach Co. The reports indicate that these corporations together owned Trailways
Bus Terminal, Inc., the owner of the terminal building and lessor of the restaurant.
This was probably the sole evidence of direct connection, other than use, between
the carrier and the restaurant. The dissent argues that since this evidence was not
presented to the Virginia court and since that court could not properly have taken
notice of it, this evidence could not be considered by the Supreme Court. 81 Sup.
Ct. 182, 189 n.5 (1960).
2. VA. CoDm ANN. § 18. 1-173 (Supp. 1960).
3. 361 U.S. 958 (1960). The question was apparently not briefed by petitioner
either.
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the Virginia statute was error. Boynton v. Virginia, 81 Sup. Ct. 182
(1960).
It has been established that section 3(1) of the Interstate Commerce
Act 4 forbids any railroad to discriminate against or segregate its passengers
on the basis of race. 5 This section has been interpreted not only to prohibit
compulsory segregation in seating practices but also to require the in-
tegration of dining cars.6 Since section 216(d) of Part II,7 which per-
tains to motor carriers, is substantially identical to section 3(1), it
follows that interstate buses are similarly forbidden to segregate.8 Section
1(3) (a) 9 of the Act defines a railroad carrier to include railroad terminal
facilities; thus discrimination by such a terminal is also branded as a
violation of section 3(1).10 Although there is no corresponding definition
in the motor carrier chapter of the Act, section 203 (a) (19) provides
that the "services" and "transportation" to which that chapter applies, in-
cludes all facilities and property operated or controlled by any motor car-
rier and used in interstate commerce." Discrimination is thereby pro-
hibited not only upon interstate motor carriers, but also in facilities
operated or controlled by such a carrier while providing interstate trans-
portation.12  Recently, several similar cases have been brought before
the courts. 18 Generally, those instituting such actions have sought to
avoid resolution on the basis of the Interstate Commerce Act and have
pressed for decision on the bolder issues of direct constitutional violation,
probably because of a desire to attack the problem of segregation in a
scope of greater genus than that involved in each particular case. This
precise situation is present in the instant case where the Interstate Com-
merce Act was relied upon in the lower state court but was discarded in
the presentation before the Virginia and United States Supreme Courts.
This reliance upon the Interstate Commerce Act creates a possible con-
flict with the Court's rules and a confusion as to the actual holding.
4. 54 Stat. 902 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1958).
5. United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 333 U.S. 169 (1948); Mitchell
v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941) ; NAACP v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co.,
297 I.C.C. 335 (1955).
6. Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 316 (1950).
7. 54 Stat. 924 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 316(d) (1958).
8. Williams v. Carolina Coach Co., 111 F. Supp. 329 (E.D. Va. 1952)
aff'd. 207 F.2d 408 (4th Cir. 1953); Keys v. Carolina Coach Co., 64 M.C.C. 769
(1955).
9. 24 Stat. 379 (1887), 49 U.S.C. § 1(3)(a) (1958).
10. NAACP v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 297 I.C.C. 335 (1955).
11. 49 Stat. 544 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 303(a) (19) (1958).
12. Boynton v. Virginia, 81 Sup. Ct. 182, 185-86 (1960).
13. Henry v. Greenville Airport Comm'n, 279 F.2d 751 (4th Cir. 1960) (An
action to enjoin the exclusion of Negroes from the main waiting room in the
terminal of the municipal airport) ; Williams v. Howard Johnson's Rest., 268 F.2d
845 (4th Cir. 1959) (An action seeking money damages brought by a Negro who
was refused service in defendant's restaurant while travelling interstate on business) ;
Coke v. Atlanta, 184 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Ga. 1960) (A class action brought to
restrain city from segregating restaurant in airport terminal building) ; Wilmington
Parking Authority v. Burton, 157 A.2d 894 (Del. 1960), cert. granted, 81 Sup. Ct.
52 (1960).
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The rules of the Supreme Court indicate that only those issues upon
which certiorari has been granted may be briefed and argued.14 The
strictness of the application of the rules in this regard appears to be
left to the Court's discretion.15 The Court attempts in this case to
justify their exercise of discretion on the ground that racial discrimina-
tion was the basic issue presented in the petition for certiorari; there-
fore the scope of review could encompass any questions arising out of this
discrimination. While such logic may be suspect, the result conforms with
the orthodox doctrine that the Court will not pass upon the constitutionality
of legislation in advance of necessity.16 Also, while the rules prohibit coun-
sel briefing and arguing an issue, they do not prevent the Court from
considering that same issue. Certainly the Court could be suffocated under
the burden of its own technical requirements if they could be employed by
litigants to compel decision on questions which the Court feels are raised
unnecessarily or prematurely. 1"
Having reached the question of discrimination under the Interstate
Commerce Act the Court then proceeded to resolve that question in such
manner as to make future results in this field hinge upon the precise inter-
pretation accorded the case holding. If the case has been decided di-
rectly under section 203 (a) (19), then it must be assumed that the
majority has found that the motor carrier either operated or controlled
the terminal restaurant. Proof of such facts could have come only from the
carrier's use of the restaurant, the lease relationship between the ter-
minal operator and the restaurant and the annual reports contained in
the United States' amicus curiae brief.1 ' However, even the most liberal
treatment of these sources shows only a continued use - a finding of
operation and control by the carrier would be quite tenuous.1 9 It is sub-
mitted that the Court's ostensible concern with this problem of operation
and control is essentially irrelevant to the actual holding.20 Rather, close
14. Supreme Court Rules 23 (1) (c) ; 40 (1) (c) ; 40 (1) (d) (1) and 40
(1) (d) (2).
15. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951).
The Court allowed brief and oral argument on grounds that were not raised in the
circuit court where only issues of law and not of fact were involved. Contra, Lawn
v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 362 (1958) ; Irving v. California, 347 U.S. 128,
129 (1954). Mr. Justice Jackson observed, "We disapprove the practice of smuggling
additional questions into a case after we grant certiorari." Flournoy v. Wiener, 321
U.S. 253, 259 (1944); McGoldrick v. Compaignie Generale Transatlantique, 309
U.S. 430, 434-35 (1940).
16. Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288, 346-49 (1936). See cases there cited.
17. It should be noted that the Virginia statute has not been declared uncon-
stitutional by this case. The Court has simply held that one of the elements required
for conviction under the statute was not present, i.e., remaining on land of another
without authority of law. However, even this holding impliedly depends upon the
supremacy clause.
18. See note 1, supra, particularly with respect to the propriety of considering
the annual reports.
19. This is echoed by the dissent of Mr. Justice Whittaker, in which Mr.
Justice Clark joined. Boynton v. Virginia, 81 Sup. Ct. 182, 188 (1960).
20. Boynton v. Virginia, 81 Sup. Ct. 182, 186 (1960). "But the fact that § 203
(a) (19) says that the protections of the motor carrier provisions of the Act
extend to "include" facilities so operated or controlled by no means should be
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reading of the opinion indicates the case was resolved directly under
section 216(d) requiring motor carriers to refrain from racial discrimina-
tion. Mr. Justice Black reasoned that since food is a necessity to interstate
passengers, once a motor carrier undertakes to supply this necessity by the
regular use of a restaurant as an integral part of its service, "the terminal and
restaurant stand in the place of the bus company in the performance of its
transportation obligations."'2 1 Thus, the location of the restaurant in the
bus terminal and the degree of operation and control exercised by the
motor carrier are perhaps totally superfluous factors, while the result rests
solely upon the finding of the motor carrier's regular use of the res-
taurant.2 2 It would appear then that where a restaurant accepts the fruits
of interstate trade through the medium of motor carriers it must refrain
from discriminatory practices. The problem still remains whether the
restaurant operator can refuse to service interstate buses.
James L. McHugh, Jr.
DIVORCE-ADULTERY-INSANITY OF THE WIFE AS A DEFENSE.
Manley v. Manley (Pa. Super. 1960).
Plaintiff brought suit for divorce a.v.m.1 on the ground that his wife
had committed adultery between May 21 and June 8, 1958 with one
Donald Wilson, named as correspondent. 2 The evidence indicated that
interpreted to exempt motor carriers from their statutory duty under § 216(d)
not to discriminate should they choose to provide their interstate passengers with
services that are an integral part of transportation through the use of facilities
they neither own, control nor operate. The protections afforded by the Act against
discriminatory transportation services are not so narrowly limited."
21. Id. at 186.
22. The Court has drawn a unique parallel to the state action cases which
bar a state from effecting through the use of some other entity, that which the
Constitution forbids a state from doing itself. But the parallel may not be wholly
perfect since this concept impliedly requires some intent to discriminate. In the in-
stant case, the fact of discrimination is sufficient. Henry v. Greenville Airport
Comm'n, 279 F.2d 751 (4th Cir. 1960); Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th
Cir. 1956) ; Easterly v. Dempster, 112 F. Supp. 214 (E.D. Tenn. 1953). But see,
Dep't of Conservation v. Tate, 231 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
838 (1956); Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. W. Va. 1948) ; Kern
v. City Comm'rs, 151 Kan. 565, 100 P.2d 709 (1940). For a discussion of the
intent requirement see Comment, 6 Vill. L. Rev. 218 (1960).
1. Pennsylvania draws a distinction between divorce a.v.m., that is from the
bonds of marriage, and divorce from bed and board which is, in effect, a separation.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10, 11 (1929).
2. The original complaint was based on the grounds of indignities. Plaintiff
subsequently amended the complaint to allege adultery. The master who conducted
the hearing recommended that divorce be granted on both grounds; however,
neither the master's nor the trial court's findings of fact need be followed when
there has been no jury trial. The Superior Court must examine the record de novo.
Boyer v. Boyer, 183 Pa. Super. 260, 130 A.2d 265 (1957).
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on fourteen different occasions within the alleged period, Wilson had
stayed overnight at the defendant's house and had been in effect living
with the defendant subsequent to the separation of the parties in October
of 1958. From these facts, the trial court concluded that defendant had
committed adultery. Defendant contested the suit on the ground that
she had been insane at the time the illicit acts were committed.8 As
evidence thereof, it was shown that defendant had previously received
psychiatric treatment and had been committed to an insane asylum for
several months in 1955. There was expert testimony, most of it inad-
missable, that defendant was a schizophenic, paranoid type, and that,
in general, this type does not know the difference between right and
wrong. However, the trial court found that the defendant was sane and
granted a divorce. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed,
holding that insanity is a valid defense to an action for divorce on the
ground of adultery, but that the evidence supported the finding that
defendant was sane. Manley v. Manley, 193 Pa. Super. 252, 164 A.2d 113
(1960).
The general rule in American jurisdictions4 is that insanity at the
time of the commission of the act is a valid defense to a divorce action
based on adultery. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Matchin
v. Matchin, decided in 1847, held that insanity of the wife was not a
valid defense.5 There is some authority6 that the pronouncement in that
case concerning insanity was only dicta; however, the declaration of the
court has been considered by a great number of cases to be the holding.7
The Matchin decision has been soundly criticized by other jurisdictions8
and, in fact, no subsequent Pennsylvania cases have affirmed the holding
because the proper factual situation has never been presented.9 Signifi-
cantly, Pennsylvania has permitted legal insanity10 and even less grievious
3. The "right and wrong" test is the legal test of insanity in Pennsylvania, and
this is the test widely used by other states which recognize insanity as a defense in an
adultery suit. Nymphomania does not constitute legal insanity. Commonwealth v.
Lockhard, 325 Pa. 56, 118 Atl. 755 (1936); Laudo v. Laudo, 118 App. Div. 699, 177
N.Y. Supp. 396 (1919).
4. Wray v. Wray, 19 Ala. 522 (1851); Broadstreet v. Broadstreet, 7 Mass. 47(1811); Bailey v. Bailey, 115 N.J.Eq. 565, 171 At. 797 (1934) ; Nichols v. Nichols,
31 Vt. 328 (1858).
5. Matchin v. Matchin, 6 Pa. 332 (1847); PA. SrAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 52.
The statutory defenses are condonation and recrimination.
6. 1 FREEDMAN, LAW OV MARRIAGn AND DIVORCt § 210 (2d ed. 1957). "That
insanity of the wife is no bar to a divorce for her adultery, is dictum, because legal
insanity was not proven by the testimony."
7. Kretz v. Kretz, 73 N.J.Eq. 246, 67 At. 378 (1907); Gilham v. Gilham, 177
Pa. Super. 328, 110 A. 2d 915 (1955) ; Hansel v. Hansel, 3 Pa. Dist. 724 (1893).
8. Wray v. Wray, 19 Ala. 522 (1851); Kretz v. Kretz, 73 N.J.Eq. 246, 67 Atl.
378 (1907) ; Laudo v. Laudo, 188 App. Div. 699, 177 N.Y. Supp. 396 (1919).
9. Brezin v. Brezin, 186 Pa. Super. 340, 142 A. 2d 741 (1958); Gilham v.-
Gilham, 177 Pa. Super. 328, 110 A. 2d 915 (1955).
10. Little v. Little, 56 Pa. Super. 419 (1914) (as a defense to divorce on ground
of desertion) ; Hansel v. Hansel, 3 Pa. Dist. 724 (1893) (as a defense to divorce
on the ground of cruelty).
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mental disturbances" as defenses to other grounds for divorce.' 2 How-
ever, it would appear from the opinion in the instant case that Pennsylvania
is finally adopting the majority rule that insanity of the wife is a bar to
divorce on the grounds of adultery.
The Matchin opinion has stood alone and for very good reasons. The
basis for denying insanity as a defense to the wife in that case was to
protect the husband from illegitimate offspring. For this reason, the court
strongly intimated that insanity would be allowed as a defense for the
husband, but not for the wife. If such was the objective of the rule, it
would seem logical that the defense should be allowed if the wife had not
in fact borne children.' 3 Certainly if insanity is a defense in a criminal
action for adultery, it should be such in a civil action for divorce, because,
in either case, the wife's act is no more voluntary than if she were coerced
by force or fraud to do the illicit act. 14 In addition, in cases where the
husband knows of his wife's mental incapacity, it seems that he should
be held partly responsible for protecting her from base men. 5 Even
though it is clear that the court's pronouncement in the instant opinion on
the issue of insanity as a defense is merely dicta, the majority opinion
states that the instant case overrules the Matchin decision. This would
appear to be an incongruity in light of the fact that the wife was declared
sane and that nowhere does the Pennsylvania statute provide for insanity
as a defense in a divorce action based on adultery. In fact, a Pennsyl-
vania statute' 6 provides that a decision of the Supreme Court shall be
binding authority on any question upon which it has passed. In spite of
this, the majority in the instant case stated that it need not follow the
Matchin decision.' 7 Since the legislature has expressly set forth the de-
fenses to a divorce action based on adultery, it would seem more logical that
it should be in the legislature's prerogative, and not the court's to deter-
mine whether or not to include insanity of the spouse as a defense to such
action.
Dennis V. Brenan
11. Moyer v. Moyer, 181 Pa. Super. 400, 124 A. 2d 632 (1956) (as a defense
to divorce on ground of indignities).
12. Commonwealth v. Lockhard, 325 Pa. 56, 188, At. 755 (1937). Legal'
insanity would be a valid defense against an indictment for adultery.
13. Wray v. Wray, 19 Ala. 522 (1851).
14. Laudo v. Laudo, 118 App. Div. 699, 177 N.Y. Supp. 396 (1919).
15. Nichols v. Nichols, 31 Vt. 328 (1858).
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 198 (1895).
17. Commonwealth v. Franklin, 172 Pa. Super. 152, 92 A. 2d 272 (1952) was
cited by the majority opinion as authority for the proposition that the Superior
Court need not always follow the Supreme Court's ruling, but that case is dis-
tinguishable in that there a constitutional right was asserted and, if the Superior
Court had followed the Supreme Court's ruling, it would have deprived a party of
a constitutional right.
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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-MEDICAL MALPRACTICE-HUSBAND'S
ACTION FOR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES NOT ONE
FOR MALPRACTICE.
Corpman v. Boyer (Ohio 1960).
Plaintiff's wife was operated upon by the defendant, a duly licensed
physician and surgeon, on December 9, 1955. The plaintiff instituted this
action on October 17, 1958, alleging that as a result of the defendant's
negligence in performing the operation his wife suffered permanent
injuries; he sought damages for medical expenses, loss of consortium
and loss of services of his wife. Defendant's demurrer to the petition
was sustained by the trial court, which decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals of Ohio, on the ground that the cause of action was one
for malpractice, and therefore barred by the one year statute of limita-
tions.' The Supreme Court of Ohio, with three justices dissenting, held
that a husband's action for consequential damages sustained as a result
of the malpractice of a physician upon the plaintiff's wife is not one for
malpractice, and is covered by the four year statute of limitations.2
Corpman v. Boyer, 171 Ohio St. 233, 169 N.E.2d 14 (1960).
The action per quod consortium amisit, which the common law gave
to the husband when his wife was injured by the wrongful act of another,
arose out of the action given to a master who was wrongfully deprived of
the services of his servant.3 Blackstone wrote of a separate remedy given
to the husband, where the wrongful act of the defendant deprives him
of the company and assistance of his wife, as an action upon the case for
damages.4 The right which the husband possesses to the services, society,
sexual intercourse and conjugal affection of his wife, collectively termed
consortium, 5 has been susceptible to much interpretation by modern courts.
There has been judicial expression to the effect that the husband's action
is one for an injury to property, 6 which continues the common law thesis
that the husband has a property interest in his wife and an injury to her
1. "An action for . . . malpractice . . . shall be brought within one year after
the cause thereof accrued." OHIO Rgv. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (Baldwin 1960).
2. "An action for any of the following causes shall be brought within four years
after the cause thereof accrued: ... (D) For an injury to the rights of the plain-
tiff not arising on contract nor enumerated in sections 2305.10 to 2305.12, inclusive,
2305.14, and 1307.08 of the Revised Code." OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.09 (D)(Baldwin 1960). The only sections pertinent here are § 2305.10 which prescribes a
two year limitation for actions for bodily injury or injury to personal property, and§ 2305.11 which is the statute of limitations for malpractice referred to in note 1
supra.
3. PROSSER, ToRTs 698 (2d ed. 1955) ; Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium,
30 COLUm. L. Rpv. 651, 653 (1930).
4. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW 565 (Gavit ed. 1941).
5. PROSSER, TORTS 683-84 (2d ed. 1955).
6. Graf v. City Transit Co., 220 Ind. 249, 41 N.E.2d 941 (1942).
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subjects the wrongdoer to a proprietary action for the loss of her services.7
The majority of courts, however, perhaps influenced by the growing
status of women in modern society, have not treated the defendant as
interfering with a proprietary interest of the husband, and it is these courts
that have differed in determining what label should attach to the husband's
action. A number of courts have held that the action of the husband is
for, and governed by the limitation prescribed for, "an injury to the per-
son," s or "an injury resulting from negligence." In other words, these
courts hold that the statute of limitations applicable to the wife's action
also covers the husband's cause of action. Other courts have taken an
opposite position, saying that the "injury to the person" contemplated
by the statute of limitations is a direct physical injury to the plaintiff, and
therefore the statute is not applicable in suits where the husband-
plaintiff is seeking consequential damages. 10 The text writers, while
conceding that some courts have held the action of the husband to be
defeated by defenses which would bar that of the wife, generally criticize
such results as contrary to the theory that the two actions are separate and
independent of each other.11 The court in the instant case was not with-
out precedent within its own jurisdiction for a decision either way of the
facts presented.1 2
The majority of the court in the principal case is apparently content
to base its decision upon the fact that the husband's action for conse-
quential damages is separate and distinct from his wife's right to maintain
an action for malpractice. In an area such as this, where the various
jurisdictions are so widely split, it would appear to be incumbent upon an
7. Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 CoLUM. L. Rev. 651, 653 (1930).
8. Sharkey v. Skilton, 83 Conn. 503, 77 Atl. 950 (1910) ; Rex v. Hutner, 20 N.J.
489, 140 A.2d 753 (1958).
9. Weaver v. Bahumes, 127 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Calif. 1955); Mason v. Delaware,
L. & W. Ry. Co., 112 N.Y. 559, 20 N.E. 544 (1889).
10. Cliff v. Seligman & Latz, 38 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1930) ; Roth v. Lundin,
237 I11. App. 456 (1925); Kraut v. Cleveland Ry. Co., 132 Ohio St. 125, 5 N.E.2d
324 (1936); Cincinnati Street Ry. Co. v. Whitehead, 39 Ohio App. 51, 176 N.E.
583 (1930).
11. I HARPER & JAMtS, TORTS 636, 640 (1956) ; PROSSER, TORTS 702 (2d ed.
1955) ; accord RZSTATEMENT, TORTS § 693, comment d at 493, 494 (1938) ; "The
invasion of the husband's interest in the marriage relation is a separate tort against
him. . . . [T]he two liabilities are distinct. Thus, the fact that the statute of
limitations has run against the wife's cause of action will not necessarily prevent
the husband from prosecuting his action." But see id. comment c at 493: "In order to
subject one to liability to a husband for . . . bodily harm done to his wife, all the
elements of a tort action in the wife must exist, including . . . the latter's [wife's]
freedom from such fault as would bar a recovery by her, as for example her
contributory negligence. (See § 494)."
12. In Kraut v. Cleveland Ry. Co., 132 Ohio St. 125, 5 N.E.2d 324 (1936),
the court held that the husband's action for consequential damages was not one for
bodily injury within the statute of limitations, but was governed by what is now
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.09 (D) (Baldwin 1960), giving the plaintiff four
years within which to commence his action. Subsequently, the court of appeals in
Cramer v. Price, 84 Ohio App. 255, 82 N.E.2d 875 (1948), held that a husband's
action for consequential damages occasioned by the malpractice of a physician upon
the plaintiff's wife was one for malpractice, and therefore barred by the one year
statute of limitations.
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appellate court to advance cogent reasoning in support of its decision,
regardless of what that decision may be. This obligation becomes even
more imposing when there are two "diametrically opposed"' 3 cases on
this very point in the court's jurisdiction. To be sure, there is ample
authority for the proposition that the husband's right of action is separate
and distinct from that which his wife possesses,14 but this conclusion is
not dispositive of the issue facing the court. When one's wife is injured
by the malpractice of a physician, to say that her husband's action for
consequential damages is independent of her right to maintain an action
for malpractice does not in any way negate the physician's contention
that the husband's action is one for malpractice as well. As pointed out
in the Kraut case, upon which the majority rests its decision, when many
people are injured by one negligent act they each have a separate cause
of action, "[B]ut all the causes of action are founded on the same wrong.
So it is as to the two actions with which the court is concerned in the
instant case."' 5 This hardly seems consistent with the result reached in
that case, or with the reliance placed on it by the instant court which
states: "We incline to feel that, although plaintiff's claim may be loosely
said to have grown out of the alleged malpractice, whether it is 'founded
on' such tortious action for purposes of the statute of limitations is an
entirely different question."' 6 The court in the instant case was called
upon to interpret the legislative intent manifested by use of the words
"for malpractice" in the statute of limitations, and not to decide whether
the husband's action is separate and distinct from any claim his wife
may possess, as the majority erroneously assumed.' 7 The word "for"
normally denotes the occasion of a condition, or "because of,' 8 and
there is no reason to suspect the legislature of intending any meaning
other than the ordinary meaning of the word as it is commonly used and
understood. Thus the statute would seem to mean an action "because of
malpractice," and therefore include such actions as brought by the plain-
tiff in the instant case. It would appear that the legislature intended to
bar actions against physicians for negligent conduct in the course of
their professional duties brought one year after accrual, and it is sub-
mitted that the present decision is incompatible with this legislative
manifestation.
Lewis H. Gold
13. Ibid.
14. See notes 10 and 11 supra.
15. Kraut v. Cleveland Ry. Co., 132 Ohio St. 125, 5 N.E.2d 324, 325 (1936).
16. 171 Ohio St. 233, 169 N.E.2d at 15.
17. Id. 169 N.E.2d at 16.
18. WEBSUR, Nxw COLLGIArE DICTIONARY 323 (2d ed. 1949).
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UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE-AVAILABILITY FOR WORK-
CLAIMANT UNABLE TO WORK ROTATING SHIFT DUE TO COLLEGE
CURRICULUM INELIGIBLE FOR BENEFITS.
Douty v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Pa. 1960).
Claimant, a married man with three children, had been a full time
employee at the Great A and P Tea Company for twelve years until he
was laid off due to lack of work on November 4, 1959. At that time he was
in his senior year as a full time day student at the University of Pitts-
burgh, having successfully completed his first three years of study while
working full time. The claimant increased his scholastic credit load
after being laid off, but his application for unemployment benefits stated
that his school curriculum was so flexible that he would be able to shift
from day to night classes if he were referred to a daytime job. Further-
more, claimant expressed his willingness to suspend his education in
order to accept any available employment. The bureau of unemployment
compensation denied benefits to the claimant. That decision was reversed
by the referee who was in turn reversed by the unemployment compensa-
tion board of review. Basing its decision on the probable inability of the
claimant to adjust his curriculum to employment which entailed rotating
shifts and on the conclusion that the claimant's primary aim was to obtain
an education,' the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that claimant was
not entitled to benefits because he failed to meet the availability require-
ments of the statute.2 Douty v. Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review, 192 Pa. Super. 609, 166 A.2d 65 (1960).
In view of the public policy upon which the legislature based the
Unemployment Insurance Act,3 the Pennsylvania courts have repeatedly
announced that the statute should be broadly construed. 4 The test of
"availability" which the courts have abstracted from the broad language
of the statute is that a claimant must at all times "... be ready, able and
1. The court based its conclusion on the following testimony of the claimant:
"Q. And you still could work such a schedule out with the University? A. Yes,
fifteen credits is full time. This semester, in my junior year, I carried twenty credits
and worked full time and this semester I am carrying - this was because of the
circumstances of being laid off, I felt I wanted to get finished as quickly as
possible - so this semester I am carrying twenty-four credits. .. " Douty v.
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 192 Pa. Super. 609, 611, 166 A.2d
65, 66 (1960).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 801 (d) (1952) : "Is able to work and available for
suitable work."
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 752 (1952).
4. Pinto v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 168 Pa. Super. 540,
82 A.2d 865 (1951); Sturdevant v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,
158 Pa. Super. 548, 45 A.2d 898 (1946). This attitude is typical of the vast majority
of the courts which have heeded the words of Mr. Justice Cardozo: ". . . an
unemployment law framed in such a way that the unemployed who look to it will be
deprived of reasonable protection is one in name and nothing more." Steward
Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 563 (1937).
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willing to accept suitable employment, temporary or full time." 5 How-
ever, since the question of a claimant's availability is one of fact, 6 the
application of the aforementioned test by the courts has produced a series
of theoretically inconsistent results when claimants have attached some
kind of restriction to their availability. Thus, a mother who refused to
accept employment on a day shift was nevertheless "available" for work,7
whereas a mechanic who had been laid off and had enlisted in a training
course in order to qualify for another position was ineligible for benefits.8
When a person declares that he will accept employment only on certain
specified shifts the courts are likely to consider two basic issues in deter-
mining his availability: whether there is a market9 for his services at the
time that he will work, and whether there is a substantial reason for the
restriction. 10 Consequently, most courts have held that even very severe
restrictions upon a claimant's availability would not render him ineligible
for unemployment benefits if there was a market for his services during
the time that he was available." A number of states, by statute, hav
definitely excluded persons attending established educational institutions
from claiming unemployment benefits. 12  Those states without a specific
statutory prohibition against compensation claims by students have ef-
fectively excluded them from benefits by construing "availability" very
strictly in cases involving student claimants. Thus, a law clerk who was
willing to work any shift between 5:00 P.M. and 9:00 A.M. was
"unavailable" for work despite a market for his services during the
evening hours.13 The Pennsylvania courts have considered four student
5. Romiski v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 169 Pa. Super.
100, 102, 82 A.2d 865, 866 (1951). See also Dawkins v. Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review, 358 Pa. 224, 56 A.2d 254 (1948).
6. Mattey v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 164 Pa. Super. 36,
63 A.2d 429 (1949); Shellhammer v. Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review, 162 Pa. Super. 327, 57 A.2d 439 (1948).
7. Mooney v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 162 Pa. Super.
183, 56 A.2d 886 (1948). Contra, Judson Mills v. South Carolina Unemployment
Compensation Board, 28 S.E.2d 535 (S.C. 1944).
8. Schornstein v. Unemployment Board of Review, 171 Pa. Super. 162, 90 A.2d
255 (1952).
9. "'Market' in this sense does not mean that job vacancies must exist; the
purpose of the unemployment compensation is to compensate for the lack of appro-
priate job vacancies. It means only that the type of service which an individual is
offering is generally performed in the geographical area in which he is offering them."
Freeman, Availability, Active Search for Work, 10 OHIO ST. L.J. 181, 182, (1949).
10. Freeman, Able to Work and Available for Work, 55 YALt L.J. 123 (1946).
11. Swanson v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 240 Minn. 449, 61 N.W.2d
526 (1953); Tung-Sol Elec. Co. v. Board of Review, 35 N.J. Super. 397, 114 A.2d
285 (App. Div. 1955). See Altman, Limited Availability for Shift Employment: A
Criterion of Eligibility for Unemployment Compensation, 22 N.C.L. Rev. 189, 196(1944). Contra, Ford Motor Co. v. Appeal Board of Michigan, 316 Mich. 468, 25
N.W.2d 586 (1947); Keen v. Texas Unemployment Comm'n, 148 S.W.2d 211 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1941). Cf., Chaharyn v. Dept. of Employment Security, 125 A.2d 241
(R.I. 1956).
12. Altman, AVAILABILITY FOR WORK, 229-33 (1950). See also Acierno v. General
Fireproofing Co., 166 Ohio St. 538, 144 N.E.2d 201 (1957).
13. Keen v. Texas Unemployment Comm'n, 148 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App.
1941) ; Note, 30 TExAs L. RE:v. 735 (1952).
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claims and have denied all of them on the ground that the claimant
limited his availability to a time at which there was no market for his
services, thereby detaching himself from the labor force.1 4 Until the in-
stant case, they had never been confronted with a situation in which a
student could adjust his schedule so as to accept either day or evening
shifts. In denying the claim in the principal case, the Pennsylvania court
is seemingly in accord with the rationale of Keen v. Texas Unemployment
Comm'n15 that pursuit of an education is not a valid reason for restricting
the hours which the claimant is willing to work, regardless of the existence
of a market for such a worker during the time when he is available.
Recently Pennsylvania has denied benefits to claimants who were full
time students on the grounds that their "primary purpose" was to obtain
an education and as such they could not qualify as members of the labor
force. 18 The courts have summarily dismissed the offer of a student
claimant to discontinue his education and to accept any available type of
employment by characterizing such offers as "promises not made in good
faith."'1 7 Although the court has never been faced with the application of
one who has discontinued his education and asserts his eligibility for
unemployment compensation on the basis of a job held while'he was a
full time student, the court has intimated that such a claim would be
denied because the applicant would not have been a member of the labor
force during his attendance at school under the "primary purpose" doc-
trine.' 8
The court's determination that in order to be "available" for work
under the Pennsylvania statute one must be willing to work a rotating
shift represents as narrow an interpretation of the availability requirement
as any court has been willing to declare. 19 In view of the extremity of its
14. Gulbin v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 191 Pa. Super.
646, 159 A.2d 37 (1960); Bates v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,
191 Pa. Super. 266, 156 A.2d 589 (1959); Collins v. Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review, 191 Pa. Super. 273, 156 A.2d 593 (1959) ; Lovich v. Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review, 189 Pa. Super. 529, 151 A.2d 647 (1959).
15. Keen v. Texas Unemployment Comm'n, 148 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App.
1941).
16. Bates v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 191 Pa. Super. 646,
648, 156 A.2d 589, 592 (1959).
17. "Certainly the legislature never intended to subsidize a college education by
payments under the Unemployment Compensation Law." Gulbin v. Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review, 191 Pa. Super. 646, 649, 159 A.2d 37, 40 (1960).
See also Schornstein v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 171 Pa.
Super. 162, 90 A.2d 255 (1952).
18. Gulbin v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, supra note 17.
19. See Altman, supra note 11 containing an excellent summary of both admin-
istrative and judicial decisions on the issue of availability as affected by shift
limitations. The author notes that no decision had yet required a claimant to be
available for rotating shifts if he were otherwise available for any of the three
regular shifts. A subsequent Ohio case, Cornell v. Schroeder, 94 Ohio App. 75,
114 N.E.2d 595 (1952), contained dictum to the effect that a full time business
student with a flexible curriculum which would permit her to work either a day or
night shift was "probably not available" for work. Benefits were denied on the basis
of an express provision in the Ohio Statute which precludes a student who regularly
attends an established educational institution from receiving unemployment compen-
sation.
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position, it would seem that the court should have presented a more de-
tailed explanation of the reasons for that position, rather than citing a
series of cases apparently distinguishable from the present case upon the
precise issue involved. 20 By ignoring the issue of whether there was a
market for the claimant's services on a non-rotating shift the court has
intimated that the pursuit of one's educational development is not a sub-
stantial reason for restricting the hours which one is willing to work.
In view of the significance of such a ruling a detailed discussion of this
issue would have been much more commendable, particularly in view
of the candor with which other courts have treated equally difficult prob-
lems in this field.21 That the court did not make articulate its rationale
does not, however, detract from the very decisive effect which its opinion
will have upon the law. It is difficult to perceive how any person pursuing
an educational course of study could now qualify for unemployment bene-
fits, regardless of his employment record. Such a result is not to be con-
demned since the general scheme of unemployment compensation legisla-
tion was designed to assist the available worker to rise above the peril of
indigency caused by a lack of work.2 2 The method by which the court
achieved this result was, however, somewhat deficient. The court has
taken the availability clause, which on its face did not preclude a student
who was likewise a full time worker from coming within the purview of
the statute, and construed it to effectively prohibit any person who is
pursuing a college degree from collecting unemployment compensation
benefits. Such an infringement upon the legislative process by a judicial
tribunal with but a cursory explanation is not to be applauded.23  If the
20. Gulbin v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 191 Pa. Super.
646, 159 A.2d 37 (1960); Bates v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,
191 Pa. Super. 266, 156 A.2d 589 (1959); Collins v. Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review, 191 Pa. Super. 273, 156 A. 2d 593 (1959) ; Lovich v. Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review, 189 Pa. Super. 529, 151 A.2d 647 (1959). In none
of these cases was the student available for either a day or night shift. Further-
more, in each case the court expressly declared that there was no market for the
claimant's services at the time that he was willing to work, an issue which the
court in the instant case completely ignored. Only in Collins v. Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review, supra, was there any mention of ability to work
a rotating shift in connection with a student's availability, and Mr. Justice Watkins,
who wrote the opinion of the court in that case, vigorously dissented in the instant
case from the proposition that the court had previously decided the issue at hand.
21. Kut v. Albers Super Market, 146 Ohio St. 522, 66 N.E.2d 643 (1946),
appeal dismissed 329 U.S. 669 (1947). This case held that a Seventh Day Adventist
who refused employment which would necessitate frequent Saturday shifts was not
entitled to unemployment compensation. Contra, In Re Miller 243 N.C. 509, 91
S.E.2d 241 (1956). See also, Unemployment Compensation Commission v. Tomko,
192 Va. 463, 65 S.E.2d 524 (1951).
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 752 (1952). See also Note, 63 DicK. L. R.v. 345
(1959).
23. "Unfortunately, the broad statutory formulae ... do not obviate the necessity
of going back to first principles and major objectives and have not frequently induced
the courts either to read their own standards of compensability into the acts or to
rest their decisions on incidental technicalities of statutory language." Risenfeld,
The Place of Unemployment Insurance Within the Patterns and Policies of Protection
Against Wage Loss, 8 VAND. L. Rev. 218, 236 (1955).
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"primary purpose" of a full time student who is also holding a full time
job is the pursuit of an education, and such a person is not considered
to be a member of the labor force, the court has seemingly rendered all
full time students ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits.
John S. Fields
WILLS-ESCHEAT-SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO INTERVENE IN
PROBATE PROCEEDINGS.
In re Turton (N.Y. 1960).
Testator died domiciled in British Honduras, leaving a sizable estate
situated partly in New York. His descendants, all illegitimate, were
domiciled in British Honduras. The Government of British Honduras
sought to appear specially and intervene as an interested party under
Sec. 147 of the Surrogate's Court Act1 in proceedings pending in the
Surrogate's Court for the probate of an alleged will dated 1955. At the
same time a petition for ancillary letters of administration by the ad-
ministrators of an alleged will of the deceased dated 1918 was
also pending in New York, and temporary letters had been issued
in a separate proceeding to the Public Administrator of New York
County. The final disposition of both instruments was pending in British
Honduras. In the New York proceeding, both the State of New York and
the Government of British Honduras sought to recover on the basis that
there were no known heirs entitled to inherit in intestacy. British Honduras
,claimed that under its local statute, it would be the decedent's sole heir
and as such entitled to all his property wherever located. The Surrogate's
Court construed the British Honduras statute, found against the claim,
and refused to permit intervention. The decision was unanimously affirmed
by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court and the question was
certified for the Court of Appeals. That court, three judges dissenting,
held that where decedent was a resident of British Honduras and his only
descendants were all illegitimates domiciled in British Honduras, the
Supreme Court of which had probate proceedings pending, the Govern-
ment of British Honduras was entitled to be heard and to participate
in the New York litigation respecting the alleged 1955 will. In re Turton,
8 N.Y. 2d 311, 206 NY.S.2d 761 (1960).
1. The N.Y. SURROGATE'S COURT AcT § 147 sets forth "Who May File Objections
to the Probate of an Alleged Will."
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In order to have standing to intervene and object in a proceeding to
probate a will, a party must show an interest in the estate of the de-
cedent - a legal interest which may be affected by the determination of
the court. 2  Since the Government of British Honduras petitioned to
intervene as a person entitled to succeed to decedent's property in the
event of intestacy according to its statute, the question is raised whether
under escheat a state takes as ultimate heir or as a sovereign taking
abandoned property. This question has been generally decided in favor
of the latter. In England it is settled that the right of the Crown is not
a part of the law of succession, but a right as to bona vacantia,3 and the
American text writers Beale 4 and Goodrich 5 accept this position. In a
recent federal case in the Third Circuit it was noted that the term escheat
is used to signify "a reversion of property to the state in consequence of
a want of any individual competent to inherit. In other words, escheat
is not succession or assignment." 8 For inheritance tax purposes further-
2. In re Bily's Estate, 96 Cal. App. 2d 333, 215 P.2d 78 (1950) ; In re Stoiber's
Estate, 101 Colo. 192, 72 P.2d 276 (1937) ; Campbell v. St. Louis Union Trust, 346
Mo. 200, 139 S.W.2d 935 (1940); Hill v. District Court, 126 Mont. 1, 242 P.2d
850 (1952).
3. ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES AcT, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. § 46 (1) (vii)
"In default of any person taking an absolute interest . . . the residuary estate of the
intestate shall belong to the Crown or to the Duchy of Lancaster or to the Duke of
Cornwall for the time being, as the case may be, as bona vacantia, and in lieu of
any right to escheat." This English statute is almost identical to the British
Honduras statute under which the Government asserts that it is an heir. Ordinance
No. 34, Year 1953, ORDINANCES OF BRITISH HONDURAS, § 53, subsection 1 (j).
The leading British case is Barnett's Trust, [1902] 1 Ch. 847, where an Austrian
with funds in England died in Vienna, a bastard intestate and without heirs. By
Austrian law, the succession would have been confiscated as heirless property - not
a right of succession. The Austrian government claimed the fund. The court held
that since the right claimed was not in the nature of succession, the maxim
mobilia sequuntur personam did not apply and that the Crown by the law of
England was entitled to the funds as bona vacantia. A more recent British case,
perhaps even more similar to the instant case than Barnett, is Estates of Musurus,
[1936] 2 All E.R. 1666. There a Turkish woman domiciled in Turkey died intestate
and without heirs, leaving personal property in England. The Turkish government
claimed the property in the nature of a trustee because of the various interpretations of
Moslem law based on the Koran, whereby the public treasury receives the uninherited
property (ownerless property) and disposes of it for the benefit of the poor. The
court held that as this property was ownerless in Turkish law, it must be treated as
bona vacantia, and so the Crown was entitled to it. The court carefully noted that
there was no dispute at all as regards the property in Turkey, as that unquestionably
goes to the Turkish government.
4. 2 BEALE, CONFLICTS op LAW 1039 (1935) "... bona vacantia is not a matter
of succession on death. It is rather a right to confiscate property to which there is:
no other claimant."
5. Goodrich, Inheritance Problems in the Conflicts of Laws, 24 MICH. L. Rtv. 558
(1926), at 561-62: "If a man leaves property in a state other than his domicile and
there are no persons entitled to the estate as next of kin, the property goes as
bona vacantia, not to the state of his domicile, but to the state where the property
is located."
6. Thompson's Estate, 192 F.2d 451, 453 (3d Cir. 1951). The court continued-
"It is not the action of the state stepping in and claiming property where the
human beings who would otherwise own it have died or disappeared and where, if
the state did not claim it, the lack of a lawful owner would be an invitation to
self-service by the first comers." In construing a state succession statute, the court
in Miner's Estate, 143 Cal. 194, 76 Pac. 968, 970 (1904), echoed those remarksL
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more, escheat is generally 7 classed as a right of sovereignty and not a
transfer by succession.8  In general, American statutory authority is in
line with this view.9 The great weight of authority holds that the prop-
erty of one who died intestate with no persons entitled to the estate as
next of kin goes to the state where the property is located, not to the
state of his domicile. 10  In a recent New York case" the Appellate
Division held that the decedent's New York bank account should be paid
to the New York State Comptroller as abandoned property, rather than
to the domiciliary administrator in California where the decedent had
resided and died intestate without any known heirs at law or next of kin,
because property left without an owner is property bona vacantia, and
as such" is deemed the property of the sovereign where found.' 2 This
decision has been followed in a recent New Jersey case.' 8 In the instant
case, the court was dealing with the alleged right of British Honduras to
participate in the New York probate proceedings which related only to
assets located in New York. The Government of British Honduras, there-
"The state, however, does not come in by way of succession, but in the event of the
absence of all who are entitled to come in by succession . . . it goes to the state by
escheat."
7. In re Estate of John O'Connor, 126 Neb. 182, 252 N.W. 826 (1934). See
20 VA. L. Rev. 913 (1934) and 48 HARv. L. Rev. 129 (1934) where the theory of
the court - that escheat is a feudalistic reversion - was heavily criticized, noting
that most American statutory and judicial authority held that it was the right of
sovereignty analogous to the right to bona vacantia.
8. People v. Richardson, 269 Ill. 275, 109 N.E. 1033 (1915), contra, where it
was held that where legal proceedings were necessary before lands could be declared
escheated to a county, this was property passing under the intestate laws of the
state, and so subject to inheritance tax.
9. CAL,. PROB. CODE ANN. § 231 (West 1957); LA. CiV. CODE ANN. Art. 929
(West 1952); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:37-12 (1952) ; 27 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 237.01(7)
(Supp. 1960). In re Clark's Estate, 271 App. Div. 691, 68 N.Y.S.2d 487, 492 (1947),
the court said: ". . . state constitutions and statutes provide that the state takes not by
succession or as the last heir of the decedent but because there are no heirs, the
state's right being the right of the sovereign, since if the state took as heir, there
would be no failure of title.
10. In re Rapport's Estate, 317 Mich. 291, 26 N.W.2d 777 (1947); In re
Forney's Estate, 43 Nev. 227, 184 Pac. 206 (1919) ; In re Barnett's Trusts [1902]
1 Ch. 847; 2 BEALE, CONFLICTS OF LAWS 1040 (1935) ; GOODRICH, CONFLICTS OF
LAWS 504 (1949). There is some authority contra: the Supreme Court of Washington
in Lyon's Estate, 175 Wash. 115, 26 P.2d 615 (1933), held that where an Alaskan
resident died intestate leaving a bank account in Washington, the decedent's domicile
controlled the situs of the property, and it was not subject to Washington's escheat
laws. The decision has met with criticism in 2 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 11, where it
was commented: ". . . the result might almost be said to be based upon a fiction.
The picture of bona vacantia is that of movables without an owner being taken by
the officers of the state. In reality, the money which was represented by the bank
deposit was where the bank was when it was proved to be without an owner."
11. In re Menschefrend's Estate, 283 App. Div. 463, 128 N.Y.S.2d 738 (1954).
12. Id. at 746.
13. In State v. American Sugar Refining, 20 N.J. 286, 119 A.2d 767 (1956), which
involved the right of the state of a corporation's domicile to escheat unclaimed
corporate dividends of stockholders whose last-known addresses were in another state,
New Jersey ruled that, while the ordinary rule (that movables followed the person of
the owner) would be followed for the purposes of intestate succession, the con-
trolling considerations called for a different rule where the domiciliary state sought
to escheat personal property of a decedent located beyond its borders, since the right
to the property of the state where it was located was more compelling than the
extraterritorial claim of the domiciliary state.
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fore, based its claim to intervene on the grounds that it was an heir.1 4
The majority, however, said they were not called upon to determine whether
British Honduras would be entitled to the property in New York and
could find no reason why the New York Attorney General should be a
party while the Government of British Honduras should be excluded.
The sole authority cited by the majority in the instant case to support
its finding that the principles on which interested persons are permitted
to intervene are "sufficiently broad" to include the Government of British
Honduras as well as the Attorney General is In re Davis' Will.15 In that
case, however, the court merely answered affirmatively the question
whether an administrator of the estate of a deceased person, appointed by
a foreign state under a claim that decedent died intestate, should be al-
lowed to intervene. The administrator there had been authorized by a
decree of the proper court of his state, and he represented the bene-
ficiaries. The force of this case as supporting authority for the principal
decision is weakened when it is remembered that the Government of
British Honduras did not represent the deceased, was not acting for a
domiciliary administrator, and was not acting as decedent's administrator
in British Honduras. It is difficult to understand the reasoning of the
majority in equating the "interest" of British Honduras with that of the
State of New York. There is no question that in proceedings pending
in British Honduras as to property located there, it was proper for that
Government to intervene. But it does not follow that the appellant is also.
an "interested party" in New York. In its sovereign capacity, New York
is interested as to abandoned property located there. The presence of the
Government of British Honduras in the proceeding would not merely
duplicate representation of a sovereign "interest," but perhaps would'
result in the forced concession by New York to another sovereign of the-
right to deal with property abandoned within New York's jurisdiction.
It is the right and the duty of the surrogate to try the question of'
interest if it is raised before allowing any person to contest, even where-
such person is named in the petition as an "interested party."'1 Inter-
vention, therefore, should not be allowed as a matter of discretion, favor
or comity.Y Although the Government asserted its claim to be sole heir-
14. The Surrogate's Court, 20 Misc. 2d 569, 192 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1959), aff'd,.
9 App. Div. 2d 759, 193 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1959), investigated the British Honduras
ordinance and found that the Government takes as bona vacantia and not as direct
sole heir, and so it could not possibly be entitled to take the property within New
York, and therefore had no right to intervene.
15. 182 N.Y. 468, 75 N.E. 530 (1905).
16. Matter of Cook's Will, 244 N.Y. 63, 72, 154 N.E. 823, 826 (1926); Matter
of Davis' Will, 182 N.Y. 468, 472-73, 75 N.E. 530, 531-32 (1905).
17. The majority alluded to treaty relations between the United States and-
British Honduras, as a Crown Colony of Great Britian. This probably refers to
31 STAT. 1939, Art. II: "The citizens or subjects of each . . . shall have full power
to dispose of their personal property within the territories of each other . . .;
and their heirs, legatees, and donees, being citizens or subjects of the other Con-
tracting Party, whether resident or non-resident, shall succeed to their said personalk
property, and may take possession .. and dispose of the same at their pleasure.... "'
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under its statute, and the lower courts determined there was no basis for
this claim, the Court of Appeals ordered intervention without passing at all
on what would appear to be the only question in litigation, that is, the
status of the Crown Colony as heir. The court may have been moved to
order intervention because of the possibility that the Surrogate's Court
abused its discretion in undertaking to probate the will which the Supreme
Court of British Honduras was considering to probate, or because it
anticipated possible res judicata effects in British Honduras caused by
the probate in New York. Of course, if the Government of British
Honduras were denied intervention, it could not raise these issues at the
probate proceedings. In addition, the majority may have recognized a new
element in the applicant's position. The sovereign sought to "provide in
accordance with the existing practice, for dependants, whether kindred
or not, of the intestate, and other persons for whom the intestate might
reasonably have been expected to make provision." In this role, the
foreign government may be said to appear not as sovereign, but as parens
patriae.18 The court, though, did not pass on these questions, I9 nor did it
pass on the only question litigated below. Because of the wisdom of
the general rule that intervention is permitted only to parties interested in
the proceeding, it would seem that this decision ought not be extended
beyond its special facts so as to allow intervention to those who can
evidence no real interest.
Arthur T. Downey, III.
18. In view of the fact that the dissenting judge in the present case wrote the
controlling opinion in Matter of Halperin, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951),
which rejected the paternalistic doctrines earlier expressed in the leading case of
Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937), where a widow was protected
against the inter vivos gifts which her husband had made without completely divesting
himself of power over the assets, it may be confidently predicted that the visting
team will have a rough battle in the Court of Appeals.
19. In view of the traditional limits on the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical
courts in probate proceedings, which have survived in modern probate procedure,
it might have seemed premature to determine the entitlement of the foreign govern-
ment at this stage of the proceedings as long as there was an open question. Simes
and Basye, The Organization of the Probate Court in America, 42 MICH. L. REv.
965 (1944) and 43 MICH. L. Rgv. 113 (1944), reprinted in SIMES AND BASYE,
PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW, 1946. The Surrogate's Court in New York, however,
has original jurisdiction over both the probate of wills and the settlement of ac-
counts, so the traditional distinction has disappeared. SIMPS AND BASYE, PROBLEMS
IN PROBATE LAW, op. cit. supra at 445. In Pennsylvania, the Orphan's Court has
appellate jurisdiction in matters of probate and original jurisdiction in matters of
accounting, the Register of Wills having original jurisdiction to admit a will to
probate. Id. at 579. It will eventually be necessary to decide whether an illegitimate
dependent whom the decedent might have been expected to provide for, although
not legally bound, claims under the law of the decedent's domicile as quasi-heir or as
quasi-creditor, and if the latter, whether his rights are private or penal in nature.
In the latter case, the State of New York might not consider itself bound to honor
them.
SPRING 1961 ]
30
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1961], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol6/iss3/5
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-MENTAL ILLNEsS-RECOVERY FOR
DISTURBANCE ARISING FROM THE PRESSURE OF PRODUCTION
LINE METHODS.
Carter v. General Motors Corp. (Mich. 1960).
Claimant had been employed by General Motors, with intermittent
layoffs, for approximately three years. On October 12, 1956, after a five
month layoff, he was recalled and placed on the assembly line. His job
consisted of routine grinding and drilling on certain wheel assemblies as
they passed through his particular phase of the operation. Claimant was
unable to keep up with the pace of the line or the instructions of his
foreman, and twelve days after starting the job he collapsed from the
emotional strain placed upon him by his inability to conform to routine.
He was unable to return to work and applied for relief under the Michigan
Workmen's Compensation Act.1 The referee granted claimant an award
for total disability, even though he had experienced a long history of
mental instability. This decision was affirmed by a divided vote of the
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board. On appeal from that Board,
the Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed, three judges dissenting, holding
that even though the disability was not caused by a single physical or
mental shock, but resulted simply from emotional pressures induced by pro-
duction line methods, not shown to be any different from pressures en-
countered by his fellow workers, it was compensable. Carter v. General
Motors Corp., 106 N.W.2d 105 (Mich. 1960).
Although in theory the workmen's compensation laws were passed
to supplant rather than supplement ordinary tort liability where the
relationship of employer and employee exists, 2 it would be unrealistic to
ignore entirely all common law negligence decisions in any comprehensive
study of workmen's compensation development in the particular area of
mental injury. Precedents arising out of common law litigation weigh
heavily in any particular court's attitude in accepting or rejecting trends
arising from interpretation of its workmen's compensation law. Where
injury to the mind was involved, the common law decisions were far
from uniform. Some jurisdictions had refused recovery for damages
resulting from mental disturbance unless there had been actual physical
damage to the plaintiff's person.3 Some allowed minor contacts, which
played no part in causing the harm, to satisfy this requirement under the
theory that the actual impact guaranteed that the mental disturlance was
1. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 411.1 et seq. (Supp. 1956).
2. HOROVITZ, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 8 (1944).
3. West Jersey I& S. R.R. v. Ward, 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 Att. 561 (1900) ; Mitchell
v. Rochester R.R., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896); Ewing v. Pittsburgh
C. & S. L. R.R., 147 Pa. 40, 23 Ati. 340 (1892).
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genuine. 4 Other courts did not demand that any physical contact be
shown, but regarded the circumstances of the accident, or the physical
manifestations of the disturbance as a sufficient guarantee of genuineness. 5
Under all these theories it was necessary that the mental or emotional
injury be traceable to a specific and spontaneous physical stimulus. In
view of increasing awareness of the problem of mental illness and the
widespread adoption of workmen's compensation laws, it was inevitable
that the problem of mental injury would present itself under the acts. It
has been generally accepted under the compensation acts that an occu-
pationally incurred injury which produces a shock to the nervous system
and subsequent mental disability is compensable. The difficulty arises in
determining what type of "injury" is necessary to support such a claim.
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions will accept a claim which
is grounded on, and results from, direct physical injury to the claimant.6
Similarly, where accidental damage aggravates a pre-existing latent
mental defect resulting in a disabling mental condition, such condition will
be compensable. 7  Many jurisdictions have extended this coverage to
include cases where an employee receives a sudden shock or fright from
an unusual, and unexpected occurrence, even though no physical impact
to the person of the claimant is involved." This theory has been extended
even further in West Virginia, which has allowed recovery even where
the conditions were not of a sudden or traumatic origin, provided that the
injuries were attributable to a specific and definite event arising in the
course of employment. 9 Other courts, examining the area of mental in-
jury precipitated solely by mental cause, have refused compensation even
4. Kentucky Traction and Terminal Co. v. Rowan's Guardian, 232 Ky. 285,
23 S.W.2d 272 (1929); Homans v. Boston Elevated R.R., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E.
737 (1902).
5. Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941) ; Green v. T. A.
Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 69, 73 At. 688 (1909); Chuichiolo v. New England
wholesale tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 150 Atl. 540 (1930). See generally Goodrich,
Emotional Disturbance As Legal Damage, 20 MiCn. L. Rev. 497 (1922).
6. Redfern v. Sparks Washington Co., 353 Mich. 286, 91 N.W.2d 516 (1958);
Hayes v. Detroit Steel Casting Co., 328 Mich. 609, 44 N.W.2d 190 (1950) ; Laichalk
v. Chicago Pneumatic Drill Co., 308 Mich. 298, 13 N.W.2d 826 (1944); Cazan v.
City of Detroit, 279 Mich. 86, 271 N.W. 516 (1937) ; O'Neil v. Industrial Accident
Fund, 107 Mont. 176, 81 P.2d 920 (1938); Capriotti v. Philadelphia Inquirer Co.,
156 Pa. Super. 509, 40 A.2d 880 (1945); Hood v. Texas Indem. Ins. Co., 146 Tex.
522, 209 S.W.2d 345 (1948) ; Peterson v. Department of Labor & Indus., 178 Wash.
15, 33 P.2d 650 (1934).
7. Barr v. Builders Inc., 179 Kan. 617, 296 P.2d 1106 (1956) ; Redfern v. Sparks
Washington Co., 353 Mich. 286, 91 N.W.2d 516 (1958); Karwachi v. General
Motors Corp., 293 Mich. 355, 292 N.W. 329 (1940). See 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S
COM PNSATION § 42.22 (1952).
8. Charon's Case, 321 Mass. 694, 75 N.E.2d 511 '(1947); Rainko v. Webster-
Eisenlohr Inc., 306 Mich. 328, 10 N.W.2d 903 (1943); Klein v. Len H. Darling
Co., 217 Mich. 485, 187 N.W. 400 (1922); Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 154
Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955), which extends the rule of Hood v. Texas Indem.
Ins. Co., 146 Tex. 522, 209 S.W.2d 345 (1948); Burlington Mills Corp. v. Hagood,
177 Va. Rep. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (1941).
9. Montgomery v. State Compensation Comm., 116 W. Va. 44, 178 S.E. 425
(1935). Recovery allowed for mental disability due to shock, exposure, and
exhaustion, directly attributable to claimant's having become lost in a coal mine for
a period of seven days.
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where the injury is attributable to a specific and definite occurrence. 10 In
Indiana it has been held that a neurotic condition, claimed to have resulted
from long continued physical stress involved in the working conditions of
the claimant, was not compensable." The Court based its holding on the
theory that the universal susceptibility to mental illness, shared by all
men, was not within the coverage of the compensation act.
The statement which perhaps best exemplifies the basic theory under-
lying all workmen's compensation laws has been attributed to Lloyd
George,' 2 who said, "The cost of the product should bear the blood of the
workmen." The accidental losses of modern industry are lifted from the
shoulders of the workmen and placed upon the employer, the industry,
and from them to the ultimate consumer. The compensation laws were
passed for the "beneficent purpose of attaining a humanitarian end which
had hitherto been frustrated by the inexorable rules of the common law."' 3
The rules of the common law for negligence actionS1 4 do not apply to
workmen's compensation where the proceeding is not for a wrong done,
but to obtain compensation for a loss sustained by reason of a disability in-
curred in the course of employment. The acts are intended to be remedial
and most certainly should be liberally construed in favor of the employee. 15
This liberal construction has obviously been applied in the area of mental
injury, and rightly so. Failure to recognize man's nervous system and its
intimate mental characteristics would, of course, defeat the remedial
purpose of the compensation laws.'" This is especially true in light of the
rapid advances made by psychology and psychiatry in the last few decades.
That a shocking or traumatic occurrence, experienced in the course of
employment, can leave its scar upon the mind as easily as hot metal or
crushing steel can damage the body, should always be considered in
judicial interpretation of "injury" within the compensation laws. But
that is not the present case. Here compensation was granted to a
workmen, admittedly prone to mental instability, solely because his per-
sonality could not adjust to the requirements of modern industrial civiliza-
tion. The real issue of this case, presented squarely by the majority in its
opinion, is whether it is industry which must bear the economic burden
10. Voss v. Prudential Ins. Co., 14 N.J. Misc. 791, 187 Atl. 334 (Workmen's
Comp. Bureau 1936); Chernin v. Progress Service Co., 9 App. Div. 2d 170, 192
N.Y.S.2d 758 (1959), appeal denied 8 N.Y. 2d 749, 168 N.E.2d 100 (1960); Toth
v. Standard Oil Co., 160 Ohio St. 1, 59 N.E.2d 81 (1953).
11. McGill Mfg. Co. v. Dodd, 116 Ind. App. 66, 59 N.E.2d 899 (1945).
12. PROSStR, TORTS 383 (2d ed. 1955).
13. A. Wilson & Co. v. Matthews, 170 Va. Rep. 164, 165, 195 S.E. 490, 491
(1938). See generally 1 SCHNEIDSR, WORKMXN'S COMPZNSATION LAW 1-10 (2d ed.
1932).
14. "The three wicked sisters of the common law - contributory negligence,
assumption of the risk and the fellow servant rule - were abolished as defenses."
PROSSR, TORTs 483 (2d ed. 1955).
15. Burlington Mills Corp. v. Hagood, 177 Va. Rep. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (1941).
16. Goodrich, Emotional Disturbances As Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. Rev.
497 (1922).
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of such disability." Using simple judicial interpretation, the majority
answers this difficult socio-political question in the affirmative. The
Indiana Appellate Court in answering a somewhat similar question stated:
"Indulging in all liberality, we cannot perceive in the Act a legislative
intent and purpose to extend its protection to those workmen who suffer,
unfortunately, from outward manifestations and symptoms of the many
possible vagaries and aberrations of the human mind which, though having
some causal connection with an employment are, nevertheless, ills all
human flesh is heir to . . "18 There may be substantial argument for
the theory that industry should bear the weight of such disabilities or that
the compensation acts should be in the form of general health insurance
for all injury or disease, no matter what the cause, but the weighing of
the merits of such an argument is for the political arena and not the
courtroom. It would appear that the Supreme Court of Michigan, in
deciding this question, has taken that one unfortunate step beyond judicial
interpretation into the realm of judicial legislation.
Robert J. Bray, Jr.
17. Carter v. General Motors Corp., 106 N.W.2d 105, 109 (Mich. 1960).
18. McGill Mfg. Co., v. Dodd, 116 Ind. App. 66, 59 N.E.2d 899, 901 (1945).
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